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Abstract 
Distributed cognition (d-cog) claims that many cognitive processes are “distributed” 
across groups and the surrounding material and cultural environment. Recently, Nancy 
Nersessian, Ronald Giere and others have suggested that a d-cog approach might allow us to 
bring together cognitive and social theories of science. I explore this idea by focusing on the 
specific interpretation of d-cog found in Edwin Hutchins’ canonical text Cognition in the 
Wild. First, I examine the scope of a d-cog approach to science, showing that there are 
important disputes between cognitive and social theorists on which d-cog remains silent. 
Second, I suggest that, where social explanations can be recast in d-cog terms, this 
reformulation will not be acceptable to all social theorists. Finally, I ask how we should make 
sense of the claim that, on a d-cog analysis, social factors are cognitive factors. 
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 1  Introduction 
There is sometimes thought to be an opposition between cognitive and social theories 
of science. Perhaps the clearest instance of this opposition is Bruno Latour and Steve 
Woolgar’s infamous “ten-year moratorium on cognitive explanations of science” (1986, p. 
280). On one side of the divide, social accounts emphasize scientists’ social and political 
interests or institutional structures. On the other, cognitive accounts refer mainly to scientists’ 
cognitive processes. In philosophical discussions, the term ‘cognitive’ is often associated with 
terms such as ‘rational’ or ‘truth-conducive’. In the present context, however, ‘cognitive’ is 
used in the sense found in cognitive science, to refer to psychological processes such as 
perception, reasoning, memory and so on (Giere & Moffatt, 2003, p. 302). Processes that are 
cognitive in this sense can, of course, fail to be rational or truth-conducive. The divide at 
issue here is therefore distinct from that concerning the relationship between social factors 
and the rationality of science (e.g. Longino, 1990; Solomon 2001). 
Recently, Nancy Nersessian (2005) has argued that the perceived divide between 
cognitive and social theories is based on a mistaken “Cartesian” view of cognition, summed 
up in the tenets of GOFAI (“Good Old Fashioned Artificial Intelligence”) (Haugeland, 1985). 
According to GOFAI, cognition involves computational processes on symbolic 
representations internal to the individual mind. Within cognitive science, GOFAI is 
increasingly challenged by a range of different approaches. Particularly important for 
Nersessian is distributed cognition (d-cog). In contrast to GOFAI, d-cog claims that many 
cognitive processes are “distributed” across social groups and the wider material and cultural 
environment. Together with a team of researchers, Nersessian has offered an analysis of the 
laboratory as an “evolving distributed cognitive system” (e.g., Nersessian, Kurz-Milcke, 
Newstetter, & Davies, 2003a; Nersessian, Newstetter, Kurz-Milcke, & Davies, 2003b). She 
suggests that this approach allows us to “integrate” cognitive and social accounts of science, 
as well as yielding other important insights. For example, d-cog might allow us to see that the 
nature of cognitive processes in science has changed over time (2005, p. 52). 
Ronald Giere has expressed similar hopes for d-cog (2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2004; 
2006; 2007; 2012; Giere & Moffatt, 2003). As well as applying the approach to a number of 
aspects of scientific practice, such as the use of diagrams and models, Giere has suggested 
that we reinterpret well-known studies by sociologists such as Bruno Latour and Karin 
Knorr-Cetina in d-cog terms (2002b; Giere & Moffatt, 2003). Like Nersessian, Giere believes 
that d-cog “bridges the often perceived gap between cognitive and social histories of science” 
(2002a, p. 285) and that the approach offers important historical insights. For example, it 
allows us to see that “what powered the scientific revolution was an explosion of new forms 
of distributed cognitive systems” (2002a, p. 298). At times, Giere also seems to go further 
than Nersessian, arguing that, on a d-cog approach, the cognitive and social “overlap” (2002a, 
p. 296) or “merge” (Giere & Moffatt 2003, p. 304). For example, referring to Knorr-Cetina’s 
analysis of experiments in high energy physics, Giere argues that d-cog provides “a 
complementary, cognitive, account of these experiments” (2002b, p. 639). In this account, 
“we can now say that aspects of the situation that seemed only social are also cognitive” 
(2006, p. 114). 
In this paper I try to assess d-cog’s potential to bring together cognitive and social 
approaches to science. Exactly what is meant by ‘distributed cognition’ is sometimes unclear. 
In Section 2, I distinguish between a general and more specific interpretation of the approach. 
Without further development, the general interpretation of d-cog is difficult to assess. I 
therefore focus on the more specific interpretation, found in Edwin Hutchins’ Cognition in 
the Wild. Hutchins’ approach is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, I consider the scope of 
d-cog: which aspects of science might be understood using this approach and which, if any, 
will remain beyond its reach? In doing so, I argue that there are important disputes between 
cognitive and social theorists on which d-cog remains silent. In Section 5, I suggest that, 
where social explanations can be recast in d-cog terms, this reformulation will not be 
acceptable to all social theorists. Finally, in Section 6, I ask how we should make sense of 
Giere’s claim that, on a d-cog analysis, social factors are cognitive factors. Can this aspect of 
d-cog help us to reconcile cognitive and social approaches? 
 2  What is Distributed Cognition? 
The canonical text for distributed cognition is Edwin Hutchins’ Cognition in the Wild 
(1995). This is an ethnographic study of navigation on a U.S. Navy ship, which Hutchins 
calls the Palau. Hutchins offers a detailed analysis of how the Palau’s crew accomplishes 
certain tasks, such as determining the ship’s position and planning its course. Typically, he 
finds, these tasks are not performed by any one individual, but by a group of crew members 
working together. Each of the crew members also makes use of a variety of different tools. 
The processes that accomplish the tasks are therefore distributed across the members of the 
team and the tools they use. Moreover, the social structure plays a crucial role in the crew’s 
activity: the way in which tasks are performed depends upon the command structures that 
govern the crew’s interaction. On the ship there is a “social distribution of cognitive labor” 
(Hutchins, 1995, p. 228). 
For example, consider the ‘fix cycle’. This is the procedure in which the navigation 
team determines the ship’s position by taking visual bearings to landmarks on either side of 
the ship. The fix cycle involves a number of different crew members. Inside the pilothouse 
are the navigation plotter and the bearings recorder. Together, they decide on suitable 
landmarks for obtaining a position fix. They then pass on the names of these landmarks to the 
pelorus operators, who stand on either side of the ship. The pelorus operators must identify 
these landmarks on the horizon and take their bearings. To do so, they use a device called an 
alidade, which has a hairline sight aligned with a gyrocompass scale. The pelorus operators 
relay the bearings to the pilothouse, where the recorder notes them in the log and the plotter 
plots them on the chart to determine the ship’s position and project its future course. The 
plotter uses various tools to carry out this task, such as a hoey, which is a special protractor 
with a long arm that can be set to the recorded bearing. 
Hutchins’ analysis thus encompasses both the cognitive acts of individuals (such as 
reading the bearing of a landmark in the alidade sight) and the social structure guiding their 
interactions (such as the ship’s command hierarchy). In this respect, his analysis is perhaps 
not so remarkable. After all, as both Giere and Nersessian acknowledge, not all sociological 
accounts are as hostile to cognitive or psychological explanations as Latour and Woolgar (e.g. 
Bloor, 1976). Conversely, cognitive theorists sometimes recognize the importance of social 
context (e.g. Dunbar, 1995). What exactly is distinctive about a d-cog approach? In particular, 
how does d-cog offer a reinterpretation of sociological accounts, such as Knorr-Cetina’s? 
The distinctive feature of d-cog, it seems, is that it treats social groups, along with 
tools and parts of the material and cultural environment, as cognitive systems. Hutchins’ key 
claim is that the navigation team may be analysed as a “cognitive and computational system” 
(1995, p. xiv). This passage already points to two different interpretations of the approach, 
however. According to the first interpretation, to analyze an activity as d-cog is to understand 
it as a cognitive process. According to the second, it is to understand the activity as a 
computational process. While the first approach is not committed to any particular view of 
the nature of cognition, the second claims that cognition takes a specific form, namely 
computation. 
As we will see in Section 3, it is the computational version of d-cog that underpins 
much of Hutchins’ analysis in Cognition in the Wild. Both Nersessian and Giere sometimes 
distance themselves from the claim that cognition is computational (Giere, 2006, pp. 107-8; 
Osbeck & Nersessian, 2006; see also Brown, 2011, p. 28). Nevertheless, it is worthwhile 
assessing the computational approach, for a number of reasons. First, Hutchins’ book remains 
the locus classicus for work on distributed cognition and forms the central inspiration for 
both Nersessian and Giere. Second, as we shall see in Section 3, the computational version of 
d-cog has much to recommend it. Third, the computational view has the virtue of being more 
specific, and therefore easier to assess, than the first interpretation of d-cog. If d-cog claims 
only that social groups are cognitive systems, without saying more about what cognitive 
systems are, then it is difficult to see how to evaluate the approach. In what follows, I shall 
therefore focus on the computational interpretation of d-cog, although some of what I say 
(especially in Section 6) will apply to the more general interpretation as well. 
 3  Ships as Computers 
At the outset, Hutchins tells us that his study is an attempt “to apply the principal 
metaphor of cognitive science – cognition as computation – to the operation of [the 
navigation team]” (1995, p. 49). Although he is skeptical of GOFAI’s claim that what goes on 
inside the head is computational, Hutchins believes that this analysis may be applied to the 
navigation team as a whole: “The system formed by the navigation team can be thought of as 
a computational machine” (ibid., p. 228). Moreover, “the computation observed in the 
activity of [the navigation team] can be described in the way cognition has been traditionally 
described – that is, as computation realized through the creation, transformation, and 
propagation of representational states” (ibid., p. 49). 
It is important to note that Hutchins does not intend his analysis to be merely 
metaphorical. In his view, applying the language of computation to the navigation team is 
“not a metaphorical extension at all” (1995, p. 364). Hutchins develops his analysis by 
drawing on David Marr’s (1982) distinction between three different levels on which a 
cognitive system may be understood. At the computational level we have an abstract 
description of the computation that a system carries out. Thus, fixing a position may be 
understood as combining two one-dimensional constraints to give a unique position in two-
dimensional space. The representational level concerns “the choice of representation for the 
input and output and the algorithm to be used to transform one into the other” (Marr, 1982, 
pp. 24-25). For example, the crew of the Palau uses the standard Western coordinate system 
and one-dimensional constraints are given by lines of position. Finally, the implementation 
level specifies how the representational system and algorithm are physically implemented. 
On the Palau, for instance, the pelorus operators determine the bearings that give the line of 
position, while the plotter determines their intersection on the chart. 
It will be helpful to see some examples of how Hutchins applies this analysis to social 
interactions. Within computer science, a daemon is an agent that monitors for certain trigger 
conditions, and takes a specified action when those conditions are met. During the Palau’s 
voyage, Chief Richards instructs another member of the crew, Smith, to watch the fathometer 
and report when the depth of water falls below 20 fathoms. Hutchins claims that here we 
have “the social construction of an information-processing mechanism” (1995, p. 192). By 
giving the order to Smith, Chief Richards reconfigures the system formed by the navigation 
team to create a daemon which will respond to certain conditions and output a symbolic 
signal when those conditions are met. 
Hutchins offers a similar analysis of “phone talkers”. These are members of the crew 
posted at each end of the ship’s telephone lines. The job of a phone talker is to receive 
messages and relay them to the relevant crew members when there is a suitable break in their 
activity. In Hutchins’ analysis, phone talkers are information buffers, which “[permit] 
communication to take place when the sender and the receiver are not overloaded” (ibid., p. 
195). The bearing recorder and log are also information buffers, since they enable the pelorus 
operators and the plotter to work asynchronously: the plotter need not plot each bearing as it 
is reported, but can instead refer back to the bearing recorder or log. The log is also a 
memory, as well as a filter, which “passes the bearings without passing the temporal 
characteristics of their production” (ibid.). 
In Hutchins’ original formulation, then, d-cog is a claim about what happens at the 
implementation level of a computation. Rather than taking place within the mind of any 
individual, the algorithm determining the ship’s position is implemented by a distributed 
system consisting of the entire navigation crew. This computational version of d-cog has a 
number of attractions. First, and perhaps most important, it offers a clear rationale for the 
claim that d-cog integrates the cognitive and the social: according to the computational view, 
social organization becomes part of the way that the relevant computation is implemented. As 
Hutchins puts it, we may “treat the social organization as a computational architecture” (ibid., 
p. 185). Second, the computational approach provides a powerful tool for understanding 
different social arrangements and assessing their epistemic merits. In this respect, it shares 
the attraction of Paul Thagard’s earlier proposal that we understand science using distributed 
artificial intelligence (D.A.I.) (1992). Third, d-cog also avoids one of the main objections 
against Thagard’s proposal because, unlike D.A.I., d-cog is not committed to claiming that 
scientists’ internal cognitive processes are computational (ibid., p. 58). 
 4  Uncharted Waters 
Neither Nersessian nor Giere claim that d-cog offers a complete theory of science, nor 
that it allows us to reconcile all disputes between cognitive and social theorists. In light of 
this, it is important to ask how far d-cog might be able to take us. Which aspects of science 
might be analyzed using a d-cog approach and which, if any, will remain out of its reach? 
These questions are rarely explicitly addressed in the literature. And, at first glance, it might 
seem difficult to answer them at this stage, since even the computational version of d-cog 
remains rather general. In itself, the approach claims only that laboratories carry out some 
form of computation; it does not say what that computation is or exactly how it is 
implemented. In fact, however, I want to suggest that any computational d-cog analysis will 
remain silent on some parts of scientific practice. 
To see this, recall that d-cog is a claim about the implementation level of a 
computation: Hutchins shows how the computation determining the Palau’s position is 
implemented by the entire navigation team and their social interactions. It is in this sense that 
d-cog seems to offer a means of integrating cognitive and social factors. Notice, however, 
that even if we accept such an analysis, a number of issues will remain to be addressed. First, 
a d-cog analysis will not tell us why a particular computation is being performed or why a 
specific representational system is being used to carry it out. Second, the analysis will not tell 
us how a representational system gains its representational status. When applied to science, I 
suggest, both of these questions receive competing answers from social and cognitive 
accounts. As a result, they will remain areas where a d-cog analysis of the laboratory cannot 
help to reconcile debate between the two. 
First, consider the choice of representational system. Alongside his study of the Palau, 
Hutchins offers an analysis of traditional navigation techniques in Micronesia. Hutchins 
argues that the Western and Micronesian systems are, in fact, the same at the computational 
level: both combine one-dimensional constraints to give a unique position in two-dimensional 
space. But the two differ radically at the representational level. For example, rather than 
taking the boat to be moving across a fixed two-dimensional space, Micronesians think of the 
canoe as stationary while the water moves past it. Progress during a journey is represented 
not by a unit of length but by the changing bearing of a reference island. One-dimensional 
constraints are sometimes provided by sightings of birds, which indicate the canoe’s distance 
from land. 
There are many questions that we might ask about these representational systems. 
Why do Micronesian navigators think of the canoe, rather than the water, as fixed? Why do 
we employ standard units of distance and time and embody these in charts and other devices, 
while the Micronesians do not? Are there still other ways in which humans might represent 
the world to find their way around it? Each of these questions concern the choice of 
representational scheme used to carry out a computation, not the way that the computation is 
implemented. As a result, they cannot be answered through a d-cog analysis of a particular 
navigation practice. Hutchins himself offers many fascinating insights into the origins of the 
representational scheme used in Western navigation (1995, Ch.2). He does so, however, not 
by relying on his analysis of the Palau, but instead by looking at the history of charts and 
other navigational tools in the West. In Hutchins’ view, the features of the Western 
representational system are historically contingent, rather than “natural and inevitable or 
simply the consequences of the interaction of human nature with the demands of a given 
task” (ibid., p. 114). 
Many of the questions that we ask about the sciences also concern representational 
systems. For example, consider classification schemes. These have been the focus of 
considerable attention in the sociology of scientific knowledge. In fact, according to David 
Bloor, “one of the central propositions in the sociology of knowledge” is that “the 
classification of things reproduces the classification of men” (1982, p. 267). By contrast, 
some cognitive scientists claim that there are important similarities in the way that different 
cultures categorize the world that are due to universal cognitive constraints (e.g. Berlin, 
1992). I do not wish to enter into this debate here. All I want to point out is that, like 
questions concerning the differences between Western and Micronesian navigation, this 
debate about classification schemes concerns the choice of representational system, rather 
than its implementation. As a result it seems that, if there is an opposition here between 
sociological and cognitive accounts, a d-cog analysis of the laboratory cannot help to 
overcome this opposition. 
The second issue that d-cog does not address is that of how representational systems 
gain their representational status (that is, why they have meaning). The reason for this, of 
course, has to do with a general feature of the computational view. As Tim Crane puts the 
point, “[a] computational process is, by definition, a rule-governed or systematic relation 
among representations. To say that some process or state is computational does not explain its 
representational nature, it presupposes it” (2003, p. 169). In line with Hutchins’ analysis, d-
cog would treat the laboratory as a computational system creating, manipulating and 
destroying representations. This leaves open the question of how those representations come 
to represent the world. Once again, this is a question that receives very different answers from 
social and cognitive accounts of science. For example, members of the Edinburgh Strong 
Programme in the sociology of science propose a theory of meaning known as finitism, drawn 
from the later Wittgenstein (Barnes, Bloor & Henry, 1996). According to finitism, meaning is 
a fundamentally social phenomenon. By contrast, of course, many cognitive scientists and 
philosophers reject this view, instead seeking to explain meaning in terms of non-social 
factors, such as causal relations. It might be thought that d-cog may legitimately defer these 
disputes about the nature of meaning. And yet finitism is arguably the central element of the 
Strong Programme, which gives rise to many of its key claims, such as epistemic relativism 
(e.g. Kusch, 2002). Here again, then, we find an important dispute between which d-cog 
cannot help to reconcile. 
 5  A Storm Brewing? 
Section 4 pointed to aspects of science that will be omitted from a d-cog analysis. Let 
us now consider those parts of science that d-cog does seek to analyze, and ask whether this 
analysis can help to reconcile cognitive and social accounts. Unfortunately, I believe that the 
prospects for reconciliation here may be limited in an important respect, since the analysis 
offered by d-cog will not be acceptable to all social theorists. In fact, rather than bridging the 
gap between cognitive and social theories, d-cog threatens to return us to an old debate 
between the two, sparked by Peter Slezak’s paper, “Scientific Discovery by Computer as 
Empirical Refutation of the Strong Programme” (1989). 
Slezak focused on computer discovery programs such as BACON (Langley, 
Bradshaw, & Simon, 1983). Given the relevant data, BACON is able to “rediscover” various 
empirical laws, such as the ideal gas law. According to Slezak, programs like BACON 
constituted a decisive refutation of the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge (SSK), which claims that “social factors are an irreducible component of 
scientific discovery” (1989, p. 564).1 In fact, for Slezak, the “very possibility of computer 
programs making scientific discoveries poses a fundamental challenge to SSK’s radical 
claims” (1989, p. 564). 
Slezak’s argument proved controversial. Even supporters of cognitive accounts took 
issue with his claim that BACON was capable of making scientific discoveries. For example, 
Thagard noted that such programs “are highly simplified and do not constitute full 
simulations of how discoveries were actually made” (1989, p. 654). Interestingly, however, 
most commentators agreed that, if computer programs could make discoveries, SSK would be 
refuted. For example, in response to Slezak’s paper, Giere wrote: 
A minimal claim of a sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) would be 
that the course of science is necessarily influenced by the human interests of 
scientists, which are in turn partially shaped by their social relationships. If 
computers have no human interests and no social relationships, and yet can 
make scientific discoveries, this minimal claim would be refuted. (1989, p. 639) 
Similarly, Harry Collins agreed that “[i]f [Slezak’s premise] is taken to mean that 
BACON reproduces social collectivities then, if true, it would be fatal for ‘the strong 
programme’ and its variants.” Why? “[B]ecause BACON is not a social collectivity” (1989, 
p. 614). 
The trouble, I think, is that d-cog poses a similar challenge to social theories. Recall 
that, according to Hutchins, the navigation team is a “computational machine” (1995, p. 185). 
As Hutchins himself reminds us, computation is independent of the physical medium in 
which it is implemented (ibid., p. 51). As a result, if the laboratory is a distributed cognitive 
system, then the computation it performs could in principle be carried out on some other 
system entirely (Magnus, 2007, p. 299). And this system need not be a social one. In fact, as 
far as d-cog is concerned, the social is only the “hardware” on which the computation 
happens to be run. Consider phone talkers, for example. According to Hutchins, they are 
information buffers, controlling the flow of information between different parts of the system. 
On the Palau this is achieved by assigning crew members a particular role within the social 
organisation of the ship. But there is nothing essentially social about an information buffer. If 
Hutchins’ analysis is correct, the phone talker might as easily be replaced by a silicon circuit, 
so long as it implements the same computation. 
Of course, d-cog would not support all of the conclusions that Slezak wanted to 
establish using BACON. For example, Slezak argued that, since BACON implements general 
rules of problem solving, its success points to the existence of “context-free or super-cultural 
norms of rationality” (1989, p. 572). A d-cog approach does nothing to suggest the existence 
of such norms: the computations carried out in different laboratories might vary widely with 
different social contexts. Nevertheless, like BACON, d-cog would appear to be at odds with 
SSK’s claim that science is essentially social. Similar claims are also found in the work of 
authors outside SSK. For example, Helen Longino writes that science is “necessarily social” 
(1990, p. 12). 
There are a number of ways in which we might try to resolve the apparent conflict 
here. Recalling our discussion in Section 4, social theorists might argue that social factors are 
necessary for those aspects of science omitted from d-cog, such as the semantics of 
representational schemes. Alternatively, we might construe claims regarding the essentially 
social nature of science in some weaker sense, which is not threatened by the possibility of 
non-social implementation raised by d-cog. For example, perhaps some social theorists might 
rest content with the claim that, while a non-social science is possible, actual scientific 
practice is social, and likely to remain so. Others, however, are keen to argue for a stronger 
position (e.g. Kusch, 2002). Taking a slightly different line, Thagard argues that D.A.I. is 
compatible with Longino’s view, since computer networks can capture the critical 
interactions that she takes to be required for scientific objectivity (1992, p. 61). Once again, 
these issues cannot be explored fully here. Much will depend upon the details of particular 
social theories. Nevertheless, I think it is important to note that there is an apparent conflict 
here and that this conflict must be resolved if d-cog is to bridge the gap between cognitive 
and social accounts of science. 
 6  Merging the Cognitive and Social 
One way in which d-cog promises to bridge the gap between social and cognitive 
theorists is by revealing that social factors are cognitive factors. For example, recall Giere’s 
claim that, on a d-cog analysis, “aspects of the situation that seemed only social are also 
cognitive” (2006, p. 114). In a similar vein, he writes that 
Thinking of science in terms of systems of distributed cognition enlarges 
the domain of the cognitive in our understanding of science. It is typically 
assumed that there is a sharp divide between the cognitive and the social. From 
the perspective of distributed cognition, what many regard as purely social 
determinants of scientific belief can be seen as part of a cognitive system, and 
thus within the purview of a cognitive understanding of science. There is no 
longer a sharp divide. The cognitive and the social overlap. (Giere, 2002a, p. 
296) 
With d-cog, we are told, the cognitive and social “merge” (Giere & Moffatt 2003, p. 
304). 
How exactly should we understand these claims? And how might this aspect of d-cog 
help us to reconcile cognitive and social theories of science? To answer these questions, we 
first need to understand what is meant by ‘cognition’ in this context. In everyday contexts, we 
normally use the term ‘cognitive’ to refer to internal, psychological processes such as 
perception, memory, reasoning, and so on. Moreover, it seems that it was broadly this sense 
of cognition that was at stake in our original dispute between cognitive and social theories of 
science: social theorists argue for the importance of social factors, such as social status or 
institutional structures, while cognitive theorists stress internal, psychological processes such 
as reasoning, perception, memory and so on.  
Given our usual notion of cognition, we might wonder how external processes such as 
social interactions could possibly count as cognitive. However, Giere is keen to stress that the 
concept of cognition invoked by d-cog is not our everyday one: 
[w]e are developing a science of cognition. In so doing we are free to 
make cognition a technical scientific concept different from everyday notions. 
(2002b, p. 642; see also Giere 2006, p. 112) 
What is this technical notion? What does it mean to say, for example, that the Palau or 
the laboratory is a cognitive system in this technical sense? Giere suggests that “[t]he reason 
for calling these systems cognitive systems rather than, say, transport systems or agricultural 
systems, is that they produce a distinctly cognitive product, knowledge” (2002b, p. 642). 
Elsewhere, he expands on this idea: 
A distributed cognitive system is a system that produces cognitive 
outputs, just as an agricultural system yields agricultural products. The 
operation of a cognitive system is a cognitive process. […] But what makes the 
output of the system a cognitive output? Here I think the only basis we have for 
judging an output to be cognitive is that it is the kind of output we recognize as 
the result of human cognition, such as a belief, knowledge, or a representation 
of something. (Giere, 2006, pp. 112-3) 
Thus, a cognitive system is one which produces a cognitive output, such as a belief, 
knowledge and so on. In this new, technical sense, even distant galaxies used as gravitational 
lenses for the Hubble Space Telescope may count as part of a cognitive system (Giere, 2012, 
p. 201). 
If we understand ‘cognition’ in this way, then to claim that the laboratory is a 
cognitive system is simply to claim that its output is a cognitive state, such as a belief, 
knowledge, and so on. While this claim might be uncontroversial, it is difficult to see how it 
will help to reconcile debates between cognitive and social theories of science. After all, both 
sides in this dispute would agree that science produces a cognitive output, such as beliefs 
(and perhaps also knowledge). What they disagree about, of course, is the nature of the 
processes that produce that output. Showing that the laboratory is cognitive in the minimal 
sense that it produces a cognitive output would not appear to resolve any debates over the 
nature of the processes that lead to that output. 
So it seems that, if d-cog’s merger of social and cognitive factors is to bridge the gap 
between cognitive and social theorists, it must employ a more substantial concept of 
cognition. One obvious strategy would be to stress the computational aspect of d-cog. On this 
interpretation, to claim that social interactions are cognitive would be to claim that they 
implement a computation (and perhaps also that they result in a cognitive output, such as a 
belief). As we saw in Section 5, this claim would be likely to receive more resistance from 
social theorists. But let us suppose that this resistance could be overcome. Would a 
computational analysis of social factors then help to reconcile cognitive and social theorists?  
Of course, in a sense, it seems likely that disputes will remain. Even if social theorists 
were to accept that social interactions are computational, they might still disagree over their 
relative importance compared to internal psychological processes, such as memory or 
reasoning. Nevertheless, d-cog’s proponents might argue that there is now an overarching 
concept of cognition – namely, cognition as computation – that encompasses both social 
processes and internal, psychological ones. The difficulty with taking this line, however, is 
that Hutchins himself does not think that internal cognitive processes are computational. And, 
as we have seen, both Giere and Nersessian are also wary of the computational view. 
Put simply, then, the challenge facing d-cog would seem to be as follows. In the 
original dispute between social and cognitive theorists, ‘cognitive’ took something close to its 
usual meaning, referring to internal, psychological processes such as memory, perception, 
reasoning, and so on. According to Giere, d-cog invokes a new, and much broader, notion of 
cognition that applies to systems involving many individuals and their social interactions, as 
well as models, diagrams, instruments and sometimes even distant galaxies. At the same time, 
Giere also argues that d-cog helps to resolve the dispute between social and cognitive 
theorists since it reveals that social processes are cognitive processes. The trouble is that, the 
further d-cog’s technical notion of cognition moves away from the everyday notion at stake in 
the original dispute, the harder it is to see how d-cog’s merger of cognitive and social factors 
helps to resolve that dispute. Unless d-cog’s notion of cognition displays at least some 
significant similarities with our usual notion, it is difficult to see how it enables us to close 
the gap between cognitive and social theories of science. Instead, what d-cog would seem to 
offer is simply a new way of analyzing the social aspects of science (one which understands 
social interactions as computational). 
At this point, one option for d-cog’s proponents is to endorse the extended mind thesis 
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998). Like Giere, proponents of the extended mind thesis talk of 
cognitive systems that exist outside our heads, and even outside our bodies. Unlike Giere, 
however, they argue that such claims do not involve a merely technical sense of ‘cognition’. 
Consider the well-known case of Otto and Inga. When Inga hears of an exhibition at the 
Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) she recalls that the museum is on 53rd Street and heads off. 
Otto is an Alzheimer’s patient who carries a notebook with him wherever he goes to record 
useful information. When Otto hears of the exhibition, he looks up the information in his 
notebook and heads off. Clark and Chalmers claim that Otto’s notebook plays a similar 
functional role to Inga’s biological memory. As a result, they argue, the notebook counts as 
part of Otto’s cognitive processes, not in any merely technical sense, but in precisely the 
same sense as Inga’s biological memory. Before consulting his notebook, Otto literally 
believes that MoMA is on 53rd Street, just as Inga believes this before consulting her 
memory. If external objects like notebooks can implement recognizably cognitive processes, 
like memory, then perhaps social interactions can too (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, pp. 17-18). 
Giere rejects the extended mind thesis, since he regards it as leading to unnecessary 
and unanswerable metaphysical puzzles about the mind (e.g. 2006, p. 110-113). It is for this 
reason that he insists that d-cog involves a technical concept of cognition. If d-cog’s 
proponents were sympathetic to the extended mind thesis, however, then this would seem to 
offer a way to bridge the gap between cognitive and social theorists. Just like Otto’s 
notebook, scientists’ social interactions might be said to implement processes that are 
cognitive not in any technical sense, but in exactly the same sense as internal, psychological 
processes, such as memory. Of course, one problem with this approach is that the extended 
mind thesis remains highly controversial (e.g. Menary, 2010). But another is that supporters 
of the extended mind use ‘cognitive’ in a far more restricted manner than Giere. For example, 
in their original article, Clark and Chalmers argue that, in order to count as part of the 
cognitive process, an external device must meet conditions of “glue and trust” (Clark, 2010). 
These conditions require that, like Otto’s notebook, an external process must be a constant in 
the person’s life, directly available and automatically endorsed. The glue and trust conditions 
might perhaps be met in some cases on the Palau or in the laboratory. For example, perhaps 
the plotter always has his slide rule with him and trusts what it says without question. But it 
seems that many processes, and in particular many social processes, will not meet these 
conditions. The reports of the pelorus operators are not always directly available to the 
plotter, for example, and he sometimes questions what they tell him. So it would seem that, 
even if d-cog’s supporters were sympathetic to the extended mind thesis, further work would 
be needed to show that social processes are also cognitive. 
 7  Conclusion 
Distributed cognition offers a promising approach for understanding scientific 
practice. My aim in this paper has been to clarify the nature of that approach and explore its 
potential for bridging the gap between cognitive and social theories. In particular, I have 
discussed three apparent limitations on the computational form of d-cog as a means of 
reconciling cognitive and social theories. First, while d-cog might show how social 
interactions can implement a computation, it will not tell us why a particular representational 
scheme is used to carry out that computation or why those representations have meaning. 
Both of these aspects of science receive competing social and cognitive explanations. Second, 
the computational form of d-cog will not be acceptable to all social theorists, since it implies 
that science is not essentially social. Finally, I’ve suggested that, if d-cog’s claim to merge 
social and cognitive factors involves only a technical concept of cognition, then it is difficult 
to see how it will help to reconcile debate between cognitive and social theorists. None of 
these issues should lead us to reject a d-cog approach to science, but they might perhaps help 
us to understand what such an approach can hope to achieve. 
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Notes 
1. Following Slezak, I will use ‘SSK’ to refer to the Strong Programme and related 
approaches, rather than the sociology of science in general. 
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